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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL AID FOR MATERNAL AND CHILD WELFARE.-The re-
cent trend in progressive social legislation has been manifested in
many ways, and not the least satisfactory from the point of view of
the student of social welfare, is the granting of federal aid for ma-
ternal and child welfare. When the Sheppard-Towner Act,1 the first
legislation of its kind in America, was passed in 1921, it was for the
avowed purpose of decreasing the alarming figure of 13,000 deaths
annually through maternity (of which two-thirds were held by physi-
cians to be unnecessary) and to aid the 300,000 children throughout
the country who were needy and crippled, the 1,000,000 who were
tubercular and the 500,000 who suffered from diseases of the heart.2
This Act, regarded now as the forerunner of sections in the So-
cial Security Act 3 containing similar provisions, provided for the
creation of a federal board to be called the Children's Bureau, to
supervise the enforcement of the Act. The appropriation consisted
of a basic fee of $240,000 to be divided among the states and an addi-
tional amount, not to exceed $1,000,000, to be distributed to those
states which complied with the requirements hereinafter mentioned.
The basic fee (a portion of $240,000) was to be paid to each state
which fulfilled the specified conditions in the act and each state was
required to add to the appropriation by giving to her separate state
agency (designated by the state to administer the Act, or newly cre-
ated by the state for that purpose) that portion of $1,000,000 which
the federal government granted. In other words, the state was re-
quired to match the federal appropriation with the exception of the
basic fee.
In order to receive the money, however, the state had to comply
with certain regulations which were named specifically in the Act.
Each state desiring to come in under the provisions and receive the
benefits of the Act was required to establish a state agency to admin-
ister the Act and this agency was compelled to submit its plans to
the federal board for approval. The federal board was given the right
to withhold further appropriations if any state failed to comply with
the regulations.
The Act further provided that no official should .submit a child
to treatment over the objection of the child's parents. It specifically
pointed out that "nothing in this chapter is meant to decrease parental
authority." 4 Furthermore, the state was forbidden to use the money
appropriated for the purchase, erection, repair or rental of any build-
ing or for a maternity stipend or gratuity.
' 42 STAT. 224, 42 U. S. C. §§ 161-174 (1921).
2Sydenstricker, Public Health Provisions of Social Security Act (1936)
3 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 265.
'49 STAT. 631, 5 U. S. C. §§501-505 (1935).
'42 STAT. 224, 42 U. S. C. § 169 (1921).
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The Sheppard-Towner Act was in effect from November, 1921,
until its repeal in June, 1929.r
It is interesting to note that although the state of Massachusetts
made an effort to test the constitutionality of the measure 6 the Su-
preme Court of the United States refused to take jurisdiction. Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the court, said, "In the last analysis
the complaint of Plaintiff State is brought to the naked contention
that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several states
by the mere enactment of the statute. It is plain that the question,
as it is thus presented is political and not judicial in character and
therefore is not a matter which admits of the exercise of judicial
power." 7
The discontinuation of the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1929 left
the progress in national aid for maternal and child welfare at a stand-
still and it was not until the passage of the Social Security Act 8 in
1935 that a further attempt to give such aid on a national scale was
made.
This Act provides for a total expenditure of $3,800,000 annually
by the federal government, supervised by the Children's Bureau and
the Secretary of Labor, for maternal and child welfare in rural areas
and those suffering from severe economic distress. Each state which
complies with the provisions of the law receives $20,000 as a basic
appropriation. In addition to the basic fee the sum of $1,800,000 is
to be divided among the qualifying states according to their popula-
tion; each state receiving such part of $1,800,000 as the proportion
of that state's total live birth-rate is to the federal birth-rate. Two
other bases for the distribution of appropriations over and above the
basic fees are set forth. Each state receives a portion of $980,000 ac-
cording to the financial needs of the state and the remainder of the
appropriation is to be used to aid in the solution of special health
problems in the individual states. In order to meet the requirements
of the Act each state must adopt a suitable plan for the extension and
improvement of local maternal and child health centers which will be
'44 STAT. 1024, c. 53, § 2 (1927) (The word repeal is not used. The Act
of 1921 is declared to be of no force after June, 1929, by Act passed January,
1927).
0 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923).
'Professor Finkelstein, in his article on Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37
HARv. L. REv. 338, points out that Mr. Justice Sutherland presented an admi-
rable reason for declaring the law constitutional, although refusing to take
jurisdiction. In his opinion the learned Justice said, "But what burden is
imposed on the states, unequally or otherwise? Certainly there is none, unless
it be the burden of taxation that falls on their inhabitants who are within the
taxing powers of Congress as well as the states where they reside. Nor does
the statute require the states to do or yield anything. If Congress enacted it
with the ulterior purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose may be effec-
tively frustrated through the simple expedient of not yielding."
'49 STAT. 631, 5 U. S. C. §§ 501-505.
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acceptable to the Chief of the Children's Bureau. The type of plan
required is specifically indicated in the Act.9
The Act is designed to encourage further state spending and fed-
eral funds are not to be a replacement of state funds but are rather
to supplement them. For instance, in the matter of payments to states
on the basis of population, the state receives one-half of the amount
when it has been matched by existing appropriations and the other
half is made available to the state only when it is evenly matched by
new appropriations from the state.
Certain amounts which are available are not required to be
matched by state funds. Each state receives an immediate allotment
of 5% of the total amount available on the basis of financial needs;
the remainder is placed in an equalization fund and 15% of the total
amount is distributed among the states most urgently in need of finan-
cial assistance. A total of 12% of the entire appropriation is set aside
for the establishment and strengthening of suitable training centers
for personnel of the agencies which administer the Act and this
amount is available to the states without the addition of state funds.
On the whole, the present plan is infinitely more far-reaching
than its predecessor. It provides more than twice as much money in
federal funds and requires state expenditures of several times the fig-
ure expected in the Sheppard-Towner Act.10 The present plan should,
therefore, operate to reach a much larger proportion of those who are
in need of such aid.
New York State has passed the legislation necessary to comply
with the provisions of the Act and to reap the benefits thereof."
This state statute provides: that the State Department of Health is
the state agency to administer the Social Security Act relating to
maternal and child health services; that the State Commissioner of
Health is in charge; and that the Department of Social Welfare is
the agency to expend money made available for child welfare under
the Federal Social Security Act.
9 Id. at § 503 (a) A state plan for maternal and child health services must(1) provide for the financial participation of the state; (2) provide for the
administration of the plan by the state health agency or the supervision of the
administration of the plan by the state health agency; (3) provide such methods
of administration (other than those relating to selection, tenure of office, and
compensation of personnel) as are necessary for the efficient operation of the
plan; (4) provide that the state health agency will make such reports in such
form and containing such information as the Secretary of Labor may from time
to time require, and comply with such provisions as he may from time to time
find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports; (5)
provide for the extension and improvement of local maternal and child-health
services administered by local child-health units; (6) provide for cooperation
with medical nursing, and welfare groups and organizations; and (7) provide
for the development of demonstration services in the needy areas among the
groups in special need.
1042 STAT. 224, 42 U. S. C. §§ 161-174 (1921).
"Laws of 1937, c. 15, art. 16a, 2c.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States has not
yet been given an opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of this
portion of the Social Security Act,12 for no test case has been pre-
sented to it. Taken on the basis of its action on the Sheppard-Towner
Act,' 3 however, it is fairly safe to say that, should the court take
jurisdiction if and when a test case is presented to it, it will follow the
principles laid down in the Massachusetts case.1' Certainly the prob-
lem presented to the court would, in the main, be similar to the prob-
lem presented in the former case and on the basis of this previous
action it would seem that the Act will be upheld.
EDYTHE R. DUCKER.
EXECUTORY AccoRD.-The legislature has enacted an amend-
ment to the Personal Property Law and the Real Property Law in
relation to the effect of an agreement to accept a stipulated perfor-
mance in satisfaction at some future time of a presently existing right
of action or claim held by a creditor.'
"Section 33-a - Personal Property Law. - Executory
Accord.
1. * **
2. An executory accord hereafter made shall not be denied
effect as a defense or as the basis of an action or counterclaim
by reason of the fact that the satisfaction or discharge of the
claim, cause of action, contract obligation, lease, mortgage or
other security interest which is the subject of the accord, was
to occur at a time after the making of the accord provided the
promise of the party against whom it is sought to enforce the
accord is in writing and signed by such party.
2
Section 33-b. An offer in writing, hereafter made, signed
by the offeror, to accept a performance therein designated in
2 49 STAT. 631, 5 U. S. C. §§ 501-505 (1935).
2142 STAT. 224, 42 U. S. C. §§ 161-174 (1921).
14262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923).
N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 77 (§ 1, Chapter forty-five of the laws of nineteen
hundred and nine, entitled "An act relating to personal propery, constituting
chapter forty-one of the consolidated laws" is hereby amended by inserting
therein two new sections, to be sections thirty-three a and thirty-three b. § 2-
Re-enacts the provisions of § 1 into §§ 280, 281 R. P. L.).
2 3. If an executory accord is not performed according to its terms by one
party, the other party shall be entitled either to assert his rights under the
claim, cause of action, contract obligation, lease, mortgage or other security
interest which is the subject of the accord, or to adssert his rights under the
accord.
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